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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 
The amici curiae States have an interest in enforcing the 
constitutional limits on federal authority, defending their 
constitutionally protected prerogatives under the Tenth Amendment, 
and vindicating the rights of their citizens to make their own health-
care decisions.  Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 29, amici certify that no 
party or party’s counsel authored this brief in whole or in part, and no 
person other than amici contributed money intended to fund the brief’s 
preparation or submission. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) is an 
extraordinary law that rests on unprecedented assertions of federal 
authority, pushing even the most expansive conception of the federal 
government’s constitutional powers past the breaking point.   See Pub. 
L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).  The Act imposes a direct mandate 
upon individuals to obtain health insurance, marking by all accounts 
the first time in our Nation’s history that Congress has required 
individuals to enter into commerce as a condition of living in the United 
States.  The federal government identifies no limiting principle that 
would prevent Congress from employing that same power to force 
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individuals to engage in any manner of commerce so that the federal 
government may better regulate it.  Instead, the federal government 
embraces a sweeping view of the Commerce Clause — broad enough to 
reach any subject and encompassing enough to include the power to 
compel — that would imperil individual liberty, render Congress’s other 
enumerated powers superfluous, and allow Congress to usurp the 
general police power reserved to the States. 
If this Court were to uphold this assertion of federal power, there 
would remain little if any power “reserved to the States … or to the 
people.”  U.S. CONST. amend. X.  Because that is plainly not the federal 
government that the Constitution envisions, the district court should 
have concluded that the Act is unconstitutional.  
ARGUMENT 
I. The Individual Mandate Exceeds Congress’s Authority To 
Regulate Interstate Commerce.  
Simply for being alive, an individual, by federal directive, must 
purchase qualifying health insurance, or have it purchased for him by 
an employer.  See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a), (d), (f).  By attempting to 
compel people to participate in commerce, the individual mandate far 
exceeds the federal government’s Commerce Clause authority to 
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“regulate commerce.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (emphasis added).  
Permitting Congress to force citizens to engage in commerce all the 
better to regulate them is simply not compatible with a system of 
enumerated and limited powers or a system of dual sovereignty.  
Sanctioning such a power would eliminate all meaningful limits on 
Congress’s authority and sound the death knell for our constitutional 
structure and individual liberties. 
A. The Power To Regulate Commerce Does Not Include 
the Power To Compel Individuals To Engage in 
Commerce. 
1. The constitutional text and precedent are clear 
that the power to regulate commerce does not 
include the power to compel commerce. 
The Constitution grants Congress authority to “regulate” 
interstate commerce.  Dating all the way back to Chief Justice 
Marshall, the Supreme Court has repeatedly confirmed that, consistent 
with its plain meaning, “the power to regulate” is the power “to 
prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed.”  Gibbons v. 
Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 196 (1824).  Thus, commerce “is regulated by 
prescribing rules for carrying on [commercial] intercourse,” id. at 190 — 
not by forcing anyone to carry on such intercourse in the first place.  
Justice Field similarly explained that “[t]he power to regulate 
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[interstate] commerce … is the power to prescribe the rules by which it 
shall be governed, that is, the conditions upon which it shall be 
conducted.”  Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U.S. 196, 203 
(1885); see also City of St. Louis v. W. Union Tel. Co., 149 U.S. 465, 469–
70 (1893). 
Even as the challenges of economic modernization have caused the 
Supreme Court to expand the traditional meaning of “interstate 
commerce,” see United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 554–56 (1995), the 
Court has never questioned that the power to “regulate” commerce is 
the power to prescribe rules to govern pre-existing, voluntary conduct.  
Indeed the very breadth of modern Commerce Clause doctrine is what 
makes so alarming the federal government’s claim that if it may 
regulate conduct, it may also compel it.  There are now “three general 
categories of regulation in which Congress is authorized to engage 
under its commerce power.”  Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 16 (2005).  
Congress may regulate (1) the use of the channels of interstate 
commerce; (2) the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons 
or things in interstate commerce; and (3) “activities that substantially 
affect interstate commerce.”  Id. at 16–17 (emphasis added); see also 
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United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 609 (2000); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 
558–59.  In the third category, Congress may regulate purely 
“intrastate activity” that is “economic in nature” and that, viewed in the 
aggregate, has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.  Morrison, 
529 U.S. at 613 (emphasis added); see Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559–61; Raich, 
545 U.S. at 17.  Each of these categories presupposes a pre-existing 
voluntary activity to be regulated.  In particular, the third category — 
the one at issue in this case — requires that the congressional 
regulation be directed at commercial or economic “activity.”  Morrison, 
529 U.S. at 613. 
Regulation of intrastate activity that substantially affects 
interstate commerce is already at the edge of the Commerce Clause 
authority because it does not directly regulate interstate commerce 
itself.  Because broad regulation of such intrastate activities creates 
tension with our federalist system, the courts must resist “additional 
expansion” of that third category.  See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567–68; accord 
id. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  That makes the “activity” 
limitation crucial, because without it that third category would lose any 
claim to be grounded in the Constitution.  Congress would no longer be 
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regulating interstate commerce or even activities that substantially 
affect interstate commerce ― instead, it would be reaching out to compel 
private conduct where there had been no activity, and thus no effect on 
interstate commerce. 
Moreover, Congress’s “plenary” regulatory authority over matters 
within the scope of its commerce power, see Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 197, is 
strong evidence that Congress may not drag unwilling individuals 
within the scope of that power.  Congress has “direct and plenary 
powers of legislation over the whole subject” of interstate commerce and 
therefore “has power to pass laws for regulating the subjects specified, 
in every detail, and the conduct and transactions of individuals [in] 
respect thereof.”  Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 18 (1883).  Indeed, 
Congress has “full control” of “the subjects committed to its regulation.”  
North Am. Co. v. SEC, 327 U.S. 686, 705 (1946) (quoting Minn. Rate 
Cases (Simpson v. Shepard), 230 U.S. 352, 399 (1913)).  If the 
Constitution gave Congress authority to draft individuals not just for 
military service, but for any activity directly affecting interstate 
commerce, and then to exercise full control over them, the Framers 
surely would have proposed far more protections in the Bill of Rights or 
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rejected this dangerous new power altogether.  But they did neither, 
precisely because the commerce power was not some vortex of authority 
that rendered the entire process of enumeration beside the point.  Cf. 
THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 293 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961) (the commerce power “seems to be an addition which few oppose, 
and from which no apprehensions are entertained”). 
2. Congress has never before attempted to use the 
Commerce Clause to compel private commercial 
activity.  
The absence of historical precedent for the exercise of such an 
extraordinary authority is revealing; if Congress actually possessed this 
power, it is doubtful that it would have taken two centuries to exercise 
it.  When “earlier Congresses avoided use of” a “highly attractive 
power,” that avoidance is “reason to believe that the power was thought 
not to exist.”  Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997); see also 
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 743–44 (1999). 
Congress’s own legal advisers have repeatedly confirmed that 
there is no historical precedent for this asserted power.  In 1994, the 
nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office observed that a “mandate 
requiring all individuals to purchase health insurance would be an 
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unprecedented form of federal action.”  CBO, The Budgetary Treatment 
of an Individual Mandate To Buy Health Insurance 1 (1994) 
[hereinafter “CBO Report”].  The CBO explained that the federal 
government “has never required people to buy any good or service as a 
condition of lawful residence in the United States.”  Id.  Rather, 
Congress has generally limited itself to imposing “[f]ederal mandates” 
that “apply to people as parties to economic transactions.”  Id. at 2. 
Similarly, during the debate over the current version of the 
individual mandate, the nonpartisan Congressional Research Service 
advised that “[d]espite the breadth of powers that have been exercised 
under the Commerce Clause,” it is “a novel issue whether Congress may 
use this clause to require an individual to purchase a good or service.”  
CRS, Requiring Individuals To Obtain Health Insurance: A 
Constitutional Analysis 3 (2009).  And while differing on the 
constitutional bottom line, courts have uniformly agreed that the 
individual mandate is unprecedented.  See Mead v. Holder, No. 10-950, 
2011 WL 611139, at *18 (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2011); Florida ex rel. Bondi v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT, 2011 WL 
285683 at *20 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011); Virginia ex rel. Cucinelli v. 
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Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 781 (E.D. Va. 2010); Thomas More Law 
Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882, 893 (E.D. Mich. 2010). 
The absence of prior Commerce Clause legislation mandating 
private activity is not for lack of a motive; Congress previously declined 
to exercise that power even in situations where it obviously would have 
been expedient.  For example, when it became evident that “relatively 
few individuals” were voluntarily purchasing flood insurance under the 
National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 572, 
Congress made the purchase of flood insurance a prerequisite for 
participation in certain voluntary economic transactions.  See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 4012a(a) (no federal financial assistance for acquisition or 
construction of a building without flood insurance); id. § 4012a(b)(1) 
(federally regulated lenders may not make loans secured by property 
without flood insurance).  How much simpler to directly compel the 
purchase of such insurance; yet Congress never mandated the purchase 
of flood insurance by everyone in the flood plain. 
The very same arguments the government is now making in 
defense of the individual mandate to purchase health insurance would 
have applied with equal force to a flood insurance mandate: Most 
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individuals living in flood hazard areas will suffer flood-related losses at 
some point, and those losses are likely to be distributed throughout 
society by mechanisms such as governmental disaster relief.  That 
Congress did not mandate the purchase of flood insurance by persons 
living in flood plains, despite the obvious practical benefits of doing so, 
strongly suggests that Congress thought it lacked that power. 
Similarly, a power to compel commerce would be particularly 
attractive during a recession, when congressional efforts to stimulate 
the economy are often frustrated by individuals’ decisions to save rather 
than spend.  See Edmund L. Andrews, Economists See a Limited Boost 
from the Stimulus, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2009, at A1.  How much better 
for the long-run deficit and the short-term economy to mandate 
spending by individuals; yet Congress instead tinkered with different 
mechanisms for encouraging individuals voluntarily to spend more.  See 
Michael Cooper, From Obama, the Tax Cut Nobody Heard Of, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 19, 2010, at A1 (reporting that in light of “evidence that 
people were more likely to save than spend the tax rebate checks they 
received,” Congress “arranged for less money to be withheld from 
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people’s paychecks”).  Indeed, even during the Great Depression and 
two world wars, the government did not claim such a power.   
“Federal mandates that apply to individuals as members of society 
are extremely rare,” CBO Report at 2, and non-existent under the 
Commerce Clause.  The “numerousness” of federal statutes regulating 
voluntary commercial and economic activity, “contrasted with the utter 
lack of statutes” mandating such activity, is compelling evidence of the 
“assumed absence of such power.”  Printz, 521 U.S. at 907–08. 
B. The Power To Regulate Commerce Does Not 
Authorize the Lifelong Regulation of Every Citizen on 
the Ground that Most Will, at Some Point, Engage in 
Commerce in the Future. 
Under correct legal principles, Congress’s findings underlying the 
Act are plainly insufficient.  Congress found that the mandate itself “is 
commercial and economic in nature, and substantially affects interstate 
commerce.”  ACA § 1501(a)(1).  That focus on regulatory impact, rather 
than pre-existing commercial activity, only underscores the absence of 
constitutional authority under correct legal standards — instead of 
regulating activity with substantial effects on interstate commerce, 
Congress apparently considered it sufficient that the regulation itself 
would have such effects.  Requiring everyone to buy an airplane would 
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certainly have a substantial effect on interstate commerce, but that 
hardly brings such a mandate within Congress’s Commerce Clause 
authority.  Congress also found that the “decision” not to purchase a 
product, such as health insurance, is itself “economic activity.”  ACA 
§ 1501(a)(2)(A).  But treating a mental process as the relevant “activity” 
only underscores the absence of actual activity and the troubling lack of 
a limiting principle. 
1. It is not inevitable that everyone will purchase 
health insurance or consume health care 
services. 
In the numerous cases challenging the constitutionality of the 
ACA, the government’s defense of the individual mandate has 
proceeded in three steps.  First, it identifies a broad national market for 
health care services.  Second, the government claims that virtually all 
citizens participate in this broadly defined market.  Third, the 
government contends that Congress may impose on all citizens a 
requirement to purchase health insurance as a means of regulating the 
way those citizens pay for services in the interstate health care market. 
The government’s theory thus boils down to the claim that if it can 
identify an “interstate market” in a broadly defined commodity, such as 
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“health care services,” that most individuals will need to consume at 
some point in their lives, it can then regulate everyone at every moment 
of their lives, from cradle to grave, as if they were at that very moment 
active participants in the interstate market in question.  That is 
troubling and far too broad.  Just as “depending on the level of 
generality, any activity can be looked upon as commercial,” Lopez, 514 
U.S. at 565, the government’s theory shows that, depending on the level 
of generality, anyone, no matter how dormant, could be looked at (under 
the government’s approach) as participating in a market. 
In the first place, the relevant market here is insurance, not 
health care.  The individual mandate does not force participation in the 
health care market or even mandate the use of insurance once 
purchased.  Instead, it forces people to pay now for health care that they 
may or may not receive at some point in the future.  But many people 
voluntarily decide to forego the purchase of health insurance, and many 
do so for reasons having nothing to do with the incentives created by 
other federal programs.   
The government has attempted to distinguish health insurance on 
the ground that everyone will participate in the health care market at 
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some point.  But that is not strictly true, and does not render the 
market unique.  The government cannot contend that all these 
individuals will necessarily participate in the health care market (much 
less that they will all fail to pay for any services).  Some will not 
participate due to religious scruples or individual circumstances. Indeed 
even the government concedes that participation in the health care 
market is not truly universal, as it feels the need to qualify its still-
expansive claim that “[v]irtually all Americans participate” in the 
health care market.  And participation in the health care market is not 
as truly universal as participation in the market for basic necessities, 
like food and clothing.  
Moreover, even if it were permissible (it is not) for Congress to 
adopt a false presumption that every individual will participate in the 
health care market at some point in time, Congress still would not have 
the power to force individuals into the market at other times.  An 
individual becomes subject to regulation only at the point at which the 
individual engages in a “commercial transaction” or other “economic 
activity” in or substantially affecting interstate commerce.  Lopez, 514 
U.S. at 560–61.  The Court has never held commercial regulation 
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justified based on a mere likelihood of economic activity at some 
unknown, perhaps distant, point in the future. 
2. Exercising regulatory authority over everyone 
on the theory that most people will eventually 
engage in an activity would impermissibly give 
Congress an unbounded police power. 
This novel theory — that Congress may exercise its plenary 
commerce power over all individuals at all times based on the likelihood 
that most citizens will participate in a broadly defined national market 
at some time — fails for the additional reason that it would vastly 
expand congressional power at the expense of States and our system of 
dual federalism.  The “Constitution created a Federal Government of 
limited powers, while reserving a generalized police power to the 
States.”  Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618 n.8 (quoting New York v. United 
States, 505 U.S. 144, 155 (1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Thus, the “scope of the interstate commerce power ‘must be considered 
in light of our dual system of government, and may not be extended so 
as to … obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is 
local and create a completely centralized government.’”  Lopez, 514 U.S. 
at 557 (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 
(1937)).  In particular, the Commerce Clause may not be read to grant 
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the federal government “a general police power.”  Lopez at 567; see id. at 
564.  
But that is precisely what the government’s theory would do.  
Every individual would be at all times subject to federal regulation of 
his or her private decisions related to health care or anything else that 
substantially affects interstate commerce (which it to say, almost 
everything).  There is no logical reason why such regulation would have 
to be limited to the decision whether to purchase health insurance.  
Congress could regulate other decisions bearing on an individual’s 
supposed “active participation in the health care market,” such as 
whether to have an annual physical or to undertake certain courses of 
treatment.  The federal government’s interest in controlling the cost of 
health care would likewise give Congress authority to order individuals 
to eat more vegetables and fewer desserts, to exercise at least 45 
minutes per day, to sleep at least eight hours per day, and to drink one 
glass of wine a day but never any beer.  Congress could rationally 
conclude that such mandates would control health-care costs, more 
directly and perhaps more effectively, than ordering people to pay for 
services in a particular way. 
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Even apart from health care, most citizens participate in a 
number of interstate markets at some point in their lives, including 
markets for housing, food, clothing, education, and transportation.  
Indeed, the need for food and clothing is at least as pressing and 
ubiquitous as health care.  By the government’s logic, Congress could 
legislate as if all citizens were participants in those interstate markets 
at all times, and tell them what type of housing, food, and clothing to 
consume, and how to pay for them.   
This is precisely the sort of limitless reading of the Commerce 
Clause that the Supreme Court has foreclosed.  So long as the 
commerce power is “subject to outer limits,” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557, it 
cannot be invoked to justify the imposition of a cradle-to-grave 
regulatory regime on all or nearly all individuals in the United States. 
3. “Cost-shifting” is neither unique to the health 
care context nor a basis for departing from 
fundamental constitutional precepts.  
The government has suggested that “cost-shifting” is a unique 
feature that distinguishes the health care services market from other 
markets and justifies the especially intrusive regulation represented by 
the individual mandate.  But uniqueness is not a talisman that justifies 
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the government’s use of unconstitutional means; if anything, the 
government’s repeated emphasis on purported uniqueness only 
underscores its lack of a viable legal theory.  And as noted above, the 
only thing that is really unique here is Congress’s unprecedented 
attempt to use its authority to regulate commerce as a basis for 
conscripting people into participating in commerce. 
Cost-shifting is certainly not unique to this context.  It is an 
inherent aspect of many markets due to the frequent availability of 
bankruptcy protection and other government-funded financial 
assistance and services.  On the same rationale, therefore, the 
government could require everyone to adopt arguably prudent practices 
to protect their financial status, as well as that of their dependents, by, 
for example:  maintaining minimum levels of life insurance; avoiding 
risky investments; and not incurring more than a certain amount of 
debt.  Similarly, because the eventual need for burial or cremation 
services is at least as likely as the need for health care, the government 
would evidently assert authority to require everyone to pre-pay for a 
coffin or urn, to avoid shifting costs onto the public. 
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The Supreme Court rejected a similar cost-shifting and insurance 
rationale in Lopez and Morrison.  In Lopez, the government argued that 
Congress could regulate violent crime under the commerce power 
because “the costs of violent crime are substantial, and, through the 
mechanism of insurance, those costs are spread throughout the 
population.”  514 U.S. at 563–64.  The Court reasoned that under this 
cost-shifting and insurance rationale, “Congress could regulate not only 
all violent crime, but all activities that might lead to violent crime, 
regardless of how tenuously they relate to interstate commerce.”  Id. at 
564.  Morrison similarly rejected the government’s argument that 
gender-motivated violence affects interstate commerce by, among other 
things, “increasing medical and other costs.”  529 U.S. at 615. 
The cost-shifting and insurance rationale is even weaker here 
insofar as the government would apply it to almost all Americans solely 
for being alive, not only to people who engage in specific targeted 
activities.  And unlike violent crime, the cost-shifting problem is also of 
Congress’s making — Congress made the decision to guarantee free 
healthcare to uninsured individuals through the Emergency Medical 
Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd.  It is 
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absurd to argue that Congress’s decision to make healthcare available 
for free gives it authority to force everyone to pre-pay for that service 
(regardless of whether they ever use or want it). 
C. The Individual Mandate Is Not a Necessary and 
Proper Means of Executing the Commerce Power. 
The government nonetheless has argued that the individual 
mandate is justified under the Necessary and Proper Clause.  But even 
that “last, best hope of those who defend ultra vires congressional 
action,” Printz, 521 U.S. at 923, cannot be stretched so far. 
As the Supreme Court has long held, a law that is inconsistent 
with the “letter and spirit” of the Constitution is not a “proper” means of 
executing an enumerated power.  McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 
421 (1819).  The Court has also made clear that when a law violates 
fundamental constitutional principles, “it is not a ‘La[w] … proper for 
carrying into Execution the Commerce Clause,’ and is thus, in the 
words of the Federalist, ‘merely [an] ac[t] of usurpation’ which 
‘deserve[s] to be treated as such.’”  Printz, 521 U.S. at 923–24 
(alterations in original) (citation omitted); see also Alden, 527 U.S. at 
733–34 (same).  One such principle, which is “deeply ingrained in our 
constitutional history,” is that the “Constitution created a Federal 
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Government of limited powers, while reserving a generalized police 
power to the States.”  Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618 n.8 (quoting New York, 
505 U.S. at 155) (internal quotation marks omitted).  These “precepts of 
federalism embodied in the Constitution inform which powers are 
properly exercised by the National Government” under the Necessary 
and Proper Clause.  United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1967 
(2010) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
As explained above, the individual mandate would violate the 
fundamental constitutional principle that the federal government is one 
“of limited powers.”  Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618 n.8.  It is far from 
“Proper” to eviscerate that basic constitutional precept.   
Moreover, the mandate is not “incidental” (McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 
411) to some other legitimate regulation under the Commerce Clause.  
Congress sought to “increase the number and share of Americans who 
are insured,” ACA § 1501(a)(2)(C), and it did so by the most direct route 
available:  requiring them to be insured.  Thus this is not a means to 
some legitimate end, but an end in itself.  The Supreme Court has long 
held that Congress may not invoke the Necessary and Proper Clause to 
exercise any “great substantive and independent power,” only powers 
USCA Case #11-5047      Document #1309536      Filed: 05/23/2011      Page 31 of 43
22 
 
that are “incidental to those powers which are expressly given” and 
which “subserve the legitimate objects of” the federal government.  
McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 411.  But the power exercised here is distinct 
from any Commerce Clause power ever exercised and could not have 
been granted without prompting contemporaneous objection.  The 
fundamental problem is that Congress has invoked a power that it was 
not granted under the Commerce Clause, the Necessary and Proper 
Clause or anywhere else.      
The multi-factor inquiry used by the Supreme Court in its most 
recent exposition of the Necessary and Proper Clause confirms that the 
individual mandate is not necessary and proper.  See Comstock, 130 S. 
Ct. at 1949.  Comstock upheld a civil-commitment statute for prisoners 
with certain mental health issues after considering four contextual 
factors, none of which supports invocation of that Clause here. 
While there was a “long history of federal involvement” in prison-
related mental health statutes, id., there is no history of the federal 
government mandating the purchase of health insurance (or any other 
commodity).  Similarly, the individual mandate is not “reasonably 
adapted” to Congress’s “responsibilities.”  Id. at 1961–62.  Unlike 
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Comstock, where the common law imposed obligations on the 
government as custodian, the federal government has no legal duty to 
undertake the unprecedented step of providing or mandating health 
care to everyone legally in the country. 
Nor does the individual mandate have only a “narrow” scope.  Id. 
at 1949, 1364–65; cf. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566 (“the question of 
congressional power under the Commerce Clause is ‘necessarily one of 
degree’”) (citation omitted).  It applies to almost everyone legally living 
in the United States, solely because they live in the United States.  26 
U.S.C. § 5000A(a), (d). 
The individual mandate certainly does not “accommodat[e] state 
interests” by leaving them any choice in the matter, Comstock, 130 S. 
Ct. at 1962; instead, it overrides state interests in favor of a one-size-
fits-all federal mandate, even in those States like Idaho, Utah, and 
Virginia that have enacted laws expressly guaranteeing their citizens 
the freedom to choose not to purchase health insurance.  See Idaho Code 
Ann. § 39-9003; Utah Code Ann. § 63M-1-2505.5; Va. Code. Ann. § 38.2-
3430.1:1. 
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The manner in which the individual mandate runs roughshod over 
state interests is particularly egregious given that protection of the 
public health lies at the core of the States’ traditional police power.  See, 
e.g., Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 956 (1982); 
Head v. N.M. Bd. of Exam’rs in Optometry, 374 U.S. 424, 428 (1963).  
The lack of any limiting principle on this power and the reality that it 
amounts to a federal police power vitiates any reliance on the Necessary 
and Proper Clause.  See Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1964 (“Nor need we fear 
that our holding today confers on Congress a general ‘police power, 
which the Founders denied the National Government and reposed in 
the States.’” (quoting Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618)).  When, as here, the 
fundamental problem with the federal government’s Commerce Clause 
theory is the lack of a limiting principle, its resort to the Necessary and 
Proper Clause to augment that power, and make it more like a federal 
police power is a non-sequitur.  Unlike Comstock, this is a case in which 
“the National Government relieves the States of their own primary 
responsibility to enact laws and policies for the safety and well being of 
their citizens” and “the exercise of national power intrudes upon 
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functions and duties traditionally committed to the State.”  Comstock, 
130 S. Ct. at 1968 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
D. The Individual Mandate Is Not a Valid Exercise of 
Congress’s Taxing Power. 
The government has also suggested that even if the individual 
mandate is not a valid exercise of Congress’s commerce power, it is 
nonetheless a valid exercise of Congress’s power to “lay and collect 
Taxes.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.  Like every other court to consider 
the issue, the district court correctly rejected the government’s 
argument.  See Mead, 2011 WL 611139, at *22–*23; Goudy-Bachman v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 1:10-CV-763, 2011 WL 
223010, at *10–*12 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 24, 2011); Virginia, 728 F. Supp. 2d 
at 786–88; Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, No. 6:10-cv-00015, 2010 WL 
4860299, at *9–*11 (W.D. Va. Nov. 30, 2010); U.S. Citizens Ass’n v. 
Sebelius, No. 5:10 CV 1065, 2010 WL 4947043, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 
22, 2010); Thomas More, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 890–91. 
Whether the statutory penalty for not complying with the 
individual mandate is a tax is ultimately irrelevant in a challenge to the 
mandate itself, which is clearly not a tax.  The ACA mandates that 
nearly every individual in the United States “shall … ensure that the 
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individual … is covered under minimum essential coverage” as defined 
by federal law.  26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a) (emphasis added).  Congress then 
imposed a “penalty” on any individual who “fails to meet the 
requirement” of that individual mandate.  § 5000A(b)(1).  Plaintiffs’ 
main constitutional challenge is to the mandate itself, which makes it 
unlawful not to secure qualifying health insurance coverage; the 
“penalty” for failure to comply is invalid simply as a consequence of the 
mandate’s invalidity. 
Cases the government has relied on in arguing to the contrary are 
beside the point because they do not involve the constitutionality of a 
regulatory prohibition or requirement, as opposed to a tax.  For 
example, United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 45 (1950), involved a 
tax on transferring a drug where the “transfer is not made an unlawful 
act under the statute” (emphasis added); instead of mandating or 
prohibiting any activity, Congress simply taxed it.  Similarly, in 
Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513 (1937), the Court 
emphasized that “[t]he case is not one where the statute contains 
regulatory provisions related to a purported tax in such a way as has 
enabled this Court to say in other cases that the latter is a penalty 
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resorted to as a means of enforcing the regulations.”  It would be 
unprecedented to uphold as a valid exercise of the taxing power an act 
of Congress that on its face purports to impose a direct regulatory 
mandate on individual conduct.  
The distinction is not a mere formality; there are important 
differences between a regulation directly mandating certain conduct 
and a tax encouraging that conduct.  Most obviously, when Congress 
provides incentives through the tax code, the choice whether to take 
advantage of those incentives remains with each individual; but when 
Congress expressly mandates an action, law-abiding individuals must 
comply.  Tax and regulatory legislation are also treated differently 
under the Constitution.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1 (“All bills for 
raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives ….”).  
Finally, whether a measure is structured as a tax or a regulation has 
tangible consequences in terms of public perception and political 
accountability. 
Finally, the legislation would still be unconstitutional even if 
Congress had not imposed a direct regulatory mandate and even if it 
had not chosen to treat the penalty as a penalty rather than a tax.  The 
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taxing power is broad, but not so broad as to eliminate constitutional 
limits on Congress’s regulatory authority.  Thus, the Supreme Court 
has long recognized that “the taxing power may not be used as the 
instrument to enforce a regulation of matters of state concern with 
respect to which the Congress has no authority to interfere.”  United 
States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 70 (1936). 
While the Supreme Court has cut back on some of the limits it 
used to impose on the taxing power, it has never abandoned, and 
instead has reaffirmed, the principle that “there comes a time in the 
extension of the penalizing features of the so-called tax when it loses its 
character as such and becomes a mere penalty with the characteristics 
of regulation and punishment.”  Dep’t of Rev. of Montana v. Kurth 
Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 779 (1994) (quoting A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 
292 U.S. 40, 46 (1934)).1  The Supreme Court certainly would not have 
upheld the federal intrusions into traditional State domains at issue in 
Lopez and Morrison if Congress had simply imposed a “tax penalty” for 
                                       
1 The Supreme Court’s statement in a footnote in Bob Jones University 
v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 741 n.12 (1974) that it had “abandoned” 
“distinctions between regulatory and revenue-raising taxes” such as 
those drawn in Hill v. Wallace was dictum that has been superseded by 
Kurth Ranch’s recognition of the continued viability of such distinctions. 
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gender-motivated violence or possession of a gun in a school zone.  This 
Court need not reach that question, however, because Congress 
expressly imposed a direct regulatory mandate, instead of imposing 
only a tax on lawful conduct. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse the judgment 
below. 
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